In this paper, we extend Thomas Hazlett’s “political spectrum” framework, which emphasizes the interaction of political institutions, interest groups, and regulatory incentives, to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the forthcoming World Radiocommunication Conference 2027 (WRC-27). While the ITU and its conferences have played a pivotal role in enabling the growth of the global Internet and fostering international coordination, they are subject to the classic challenges identified in public choice economics, including rent-seeking, bureaucratic inertia, and strategic behavior by national and commercial actors. Analyzing the institutional design, national interests, and stakeholder dynamics that shape global spectrum decisions provides insight into the achievements and the limitations of the current international system of spectrum governance. A public choice perspective offers insight into how transparency, accountability, and institutional adaptability might strengthen global spectrum governance, especially in the face of new pressures like orbital congestion and conflicts between active and passive spectrum users.